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Abstract
In 2007, a public panel discussion took place between Jürgen Habermas and professors 
of the Jesuit University in Munich about the place and importance of religion in and for 
the (post-) secular society. Habermas there explained that the relation between society 
and religion has its counterpart on a personal level as the relation between reason and 
faith. Habermas points out that practical reason can only understand itself, if it clarifies 
its relation to the religious consciousness. This paper attempts to articulate and clarify 
the form of this twofold relation.
Introduction
For some time in Western civilization,  religion has been seen as an aspect  of society
fading  away  due  to  individualization  and  modernization.  Secularization  debates  within  the
Academe in the 70s and 80s have diagnosed a withering of the impact of institutionalized religion
on societal  processes.1 Whether  this  dawn of  the secular  society was real  or  whether  it  was
always a diagnosis put forward by an elite academic culture remains undecided. What is clear
now, however, is that religion reemerged as a crucial topic in society and politics. 9/11 certainly
was a powerful sign of this reemergence. Alas, religion reemerges in different areas of social life,
in form of religious symbols in film and advertisement, in political staging and a more public
dialogue  on  religion.  Religion  is  not  dying  out.  It  looks  as  though  it  will  keep  playing  a
significant role through the modern and post-modern stages of society. 
Throughout his long-lasting prolific academic career, Habermas has attempted to describe
society as a whole.  In his  Theory of Communicative Action (1981, engl. 1984/1987), religion
appears as “historical development phase”2 on the way to a modern, democratic society. In recent
time, Habermas returned to religion reflecting on it from a different angle. Religion is no longer
viewed as a stage in this historical process of society, but rather as a moral resource that secular
society dwells upon. Especially in the discourse on biotechnology, Habermas understood religion
as an important ally to grapple with the issue.3
1
This  paper  will  present  the  most  recent  pronouncement  of  Habermas  on  the  topic  of
religion in its relation to society. Habermas took part in a public panel discussion at the Jesuit
University in Munich [Hochschule für Philosophie S.J., München] in early 2007. The proceeding
of this panel discussion between Habermas and the Jesuit professors was published in German
the following year. Although the discussion was concerned with religion in general, the focus lies
clearly  on  the  religion  present  in  Europe,  especially  Christianity.  This  paper  will  reflect  on
Habermas’ train of thoughts and the arguments of his Jesuit debaters.
A Historical-Philosophical Analysis of Our Time 
As in other recent comments on questions of our time, Habermas starts his reflection on
the place of religion in contemporary society with a philosophical-historical analysis of the time
we  live  in.  In  the  Future  of  Human  Nature (2001,  engl.  2003),  Habermas  reflects  on  the
withdrawal of philosophy from questions concerning the good life. Philosophy, at the turn of the
21st century, is unable to give advice on how to live a good life. Habermas’ train of thoughts in
that  book,  which  deals  mainly  with  the  dawn of  biotechnological  interventions,  led  him to
question this complete withdrawal of philosophy. Moral questions – in Habermas’ terminology –
deal with the just organization of society, and need to be addressed in philosophy. Philosophy
does not have the luxury of remaining agnostic about questions that affect our human nature and
that might affect the social balance.4 In his recent thoughts on the relationship between faith and
knowledge, Habermas addresses this topic of the just social interaction from a different angle. In
his reflection on religion, Habermas’ main focus is on the interplay between society and religion
on a social level and reason and faith on the individual level. More particularly he asks about the
resources provided by religion for a just organization of society.  What is required in order to
understand our time is an analysis of the intellectual history.
Starting  point  of  Habermas’  reflection  is  the  Axial  Age [Achsenzeit].  This  age,  dated
roughly between 200 and 800 BC, gave birth to the world’s main religion and world views from
Taoism and  Confucianism  in  China,  and  Hinduism and  Buddhism  in  India,  to  the  Talmud
Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the Orient and to the Ancient Greek philosophy. Karl Jaspers,
who  coined  this  term,  would  see  in  this  age  (which  is  sometimes  called  the  Age  of
Transcendence) the basis of all great civilizations and the categories of thought, which still shape
modern consciousness. In other words, world civilization dwells upon spiritual and philosophical
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developments that took place about 2500 years ago, which still shapes the way we understand,
deal and interact with the world. On this basis, Habermas perceives a unity between religious and
metaphysical world view, which shaped the outlook of Western civilizations, with their centers of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam in Jerusalem and Western philosophy in Athens.5 Both world
views  attempted  to  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  nature  and  history.  Ancient
metaphysics  was able  to  take  a  transcendent  view on the  world as  such and to  differentiate
between phenomenon and essence. This similarity of these two worldviews enabled Christian
thinkers  from  St.  Augustine  to  St.  Thomas  to  forge  a  harmony  between  metaphysics  and
Christianity,  between  knowledge  and  faith.  However,  modern  reason  has  withdrawn  from
metaphysical belief and is unable and unwilling to provide a comprehensive view of nature and
history.  In this intellectual historical setting, the question of the relation between religion and
society, faith and reason has to be addressed. 
Habermas understands faith and reason as two “complementary forms of spirit”6. Such a
comprehension rejects a naïve notion of enlightenment, which sees in religion only an irrational,
outmoded understanding of reality.  But it rejects also a Hegelian understanding of religion, in
which religion is a form of spirit subordinated to philosophy. Faith necessarily eludes reason’s
understanding: “Faith remains somehow opaque for knowledge.” (Habermas 2008: 29) Reason
should neither ignore nor simply accept this notion of the opaqueness of faith, rather it had to
grapple with it. Habermas’ motive – as he states explicitly – of dealing with religion is his wish
“to  mobilize  modern  reason  against  its  inherent  defeatism.”  (Habermas  2008:  30)  Practical
reason, as Habermas explains, doubts of its motivating power in view of the derailing modernity,
which can hardly be kept in check by the weak force of moral beliefs about justice.7
Hence Habermas’ interest is in the political and social function of religion. It is not the
very nature of religion, which stimulates Habermas’ concern; rather he hopes to find in religion
moral resources for our modernity in crisis. How could these originally religious resources be
appropriated by a secular society? Moreover, what are these resources? In other words: What is
lacking?
What is Lacking? On Modern Society’s deficiency
Habermas’ account of what is lacking remains itself diffuse. The clearest aspect of the
lack of secular society is its failure to provide adequate rituals. Habermas recounts his experience
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of the funeral service of the Swiss writer Max Frisch in 1991. The venue of the obsequies was a
church in Zürich, but no minister was present, no blessing was given, no amen was said. Frisch,
an agnostic like Habermas himself, felt that the enlightened modernity was lacking an adequate
ritual of this last rite of passage, and chose the setting of a religious site, a church, for his own
funeral service. Secular society, as Frisch must have felt, is unable to provide an adequate venue
(Habermas 2008: 26).
But this lack of a set of secular symbols is not the only thing lacking. Pondering about this
question, the first thing coming to mind is that human beings in a secular society are lacking a
certain sense of transcendence. This assumption seems to be backed as Habermas explicitly refers
to Theodor W. Adorno as the main influence for the formulation of the title. Adorno’s negative
dialectics  is  conscious  of  an  ontological  need  of  human  beings  and  Adorno  directs  his
metaphysical  speculations  towards  an  inarticulable  transcendence,  not  unlike  a  negative
theology.8 However,  Habermas  is  interpreting Adorno on the immanent  plane of society and
reason. Reason, on the subjective level, and society, on the objective level, is lacking its other
side, faith or religion. It is thus reason who is lacking something, and it is only faintly aware of it.
Following  Hegel,  Habermas  understands  philosophy  and  religion  as  “complementary
forms of the spirit”9. Against Hegel, Habermas does not see a hierarchy between these two forms
of the spirit. Friedo Ricken S.J., in his reaction to Habermas, points out that “complementary”
indicates  that  philosophy and religion  supplement  and depend on each other.  Secular  reason
draws from religious tradition and translates them into secular language. Religion needs to test its
beliefs  against  the  demands  of  reason;  reason  in  turn  is  aware  of  its  own  incompleteness
according to this quite strong understanding of an interdependence of religion and philosophy.10
But  what  then  is  reason lacking? Norbert  Brieskorn S.J.,  in  his  answer  to  Habermas,
points out four areas where reason is lacking something: First, as already pointed out, it lacks a
ritual to solemnize the last passage at the end of our lives. Modern reason fails to take serious
human finitude, and it remains undecided for the time being, whether reason can (re-)integrate
this  element.  Second, the (motivation for)  solidarity is  lacking.  Secular reason fails  to infuse
solidarity into human communities. The question is whether reason can be transformed in such a
way to transgress its individual character and motivate for habits of solidarity. Third, religious
communities  not  only  have  to  adjust  to  the  liberal  state,  as  Habermas  points  out,  but  the
democratic constitutional state also needs a legitimation out of persuasion. More than a simple,
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rational commitment is required.  In order for the political community to avoid disintegration,
more than reason alone is needed. (Habermas 2008: 32, Brieskorn 44). Lastly, the political public
space profits from religious statements.11 Habermas appreciates the recent public statements from
organized religion; especially concerning the bioethics debate concerning research on embryonic
stem cells and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. 
From the four lacking aspects pointed out by Brieskorn, it is mainly the lack of sources of
solidarity in secular society that Habermas is concerned with as his replica shows.12 From an
historical perspective, the religious topos of an inverted and lost world has become profane and
was transformed into the Marx’ notion of alienation.  Social movements from the 19th century
onward absorbed the religious longing for another world. Marx in that sense was deeply rooted in
the basic structures  of monotheistic  belief  systems,  which he transferred on the social  plane.
However, the term “alienation” turned out to be too general for scientific description of reality.
Even if alienation is not an adequate tool of description of social reality, the phenomenon that the
term sought to describe is still very much alive. Habermas gives this phenomenon a more general
turn, referring to the distorted living conditions: “Without the normative description and self-
description of distorted living conditions, which are violating elementary interests, there can be
no consciousness  of  ‘what  is  lacking’.”  (Habermas  2008:  95)  The  consciousness  of  what  is
lacking refers to a privation within this world; a privation that becomes apparent in outrageous
injustices. Given this injustice, Habermas turns to religion to provide resources of motivational
power to overcome the “unjust distribution of life chances” (Habermas 2008: 95). His argument
about the something that is lacking plays on the social as well as on the philosophical level.
On the social level, Habermas is concerned with a desolidarization [Entsolidarisierung] of
society, which is caused by the expansion of the logic of the market into previously protected
areas of life. The more the performance principle and cost-benefit analysis influence our lives the
more solidarity is threatened as this economic logic forces humans into objectifying attitudes.
The injustices of society are still considered wrong, the sense of right and wrong is still present,
however it is overwhelmed by the powerlessness of a single actor. Hence, “understandably the
withdrawal  into  the  private  and  the  repression  of  awkward  cognitive  dissonances.”13 This
tendency of a desolidarization of society is even more disturbing given a dynamic global situation
moving towards a “multicultural global community” (Habermas 2008: 96). Therefore, Habermas
hopes for a social movement which would alter the political mentality which is stuck in social
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Darwinist power play.  Habermas does not explicitly mention religious communities in such a
project, however undoubtedly he looks at them in view of resources of solidarity.14
Shifting to the philosophical level, Habermas points out the “motivational weakness of a
‘rational morality’ [Vernunftmoral]” (Habermas 2008: 97). This rational morality sharpens our
judgment and can motivate us with “the weak force of good reasons to act morally”15. However,
it is directed towards our individual acting and can indeed stimulate responsible action, but it fails
to provide a drive for collective, solidary action. While it can motivate on the individual level, it
fails to do so on the collective one: “The secular moral as such is not innately connected with
common practices.”16 The secular moral stands in contrast to the religious moral, which is always
linked with the life of the community. Out of the global character of religions such as Christianity
and  Islam,  a  universal  communitarism  can  be  developed.  It  is  this  in  principle  universal
communitarism that can provide a stronger motivation for actions of solidarity than the ‘rational
morality’.17
Habermas refers to Kant, who has already sensed this inability of practical reason. Kant’s
remedy against this lack of practical reason was to turn to religious tradition and translate it into
philosophical language. In Kant, reason might come up with the same solutions with hindsight
that religion already offers. Habermas does not completely subscribe to Kant’s view, as he doubts
that  reason can provide these resources out of itself.  He rather  believes  that  reason needs to
acquire  these resources elsewhere.  Religion is  seen as the paramount  resource and thus  it  is
important to rethink the relation between philosophy and religion.18 Habermas leaves no doubt
that  practical  reason fails  if  it  is  unable to create a  “consciousness of the worldwide injured
solidarity, a consciousness of what is lacking, of what shouts to the heavens.”19
It is this passage of Habermas,  that echoes in the statements of his respondents. Josef
Schmidt S.J., following Habermas, criticizes reason and challenges a narrow concept of reason:
“Secular  reason  has  to  ask  itself  where  she  has  put  up  her  own  boundaries  of  reason
prematurely.”20 Reason might have delimited itself hastily and failed to recognize her true nature.
Reason has to be thought more inclusively and should not be reduced to a scientific rationalism
that rejects any metaphysical or religious speculation. To this point of the discourse, the debating
Jesuits  and Habermas  agreed on the  importance  of  a  dialogue as  well  as  some of  the basic
features of the relation between faith and reason. However, the answers are different when it
comes to point out in detail the relation between reason and faith, between religion and secular
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society.  In the following, I will elaborate on this disagreement and on different views on this
crucial relation further.
Diverging Notions of Reason and Religion
While the debaters agree on the importance on readjusting the relation between faith and
reason, they disagree on the extension and implications of the two central concepts in question:
reason and religion. Habermas understands reason as a social process, where questions of truth
are negotiated in an argumentative discourse. Reason is understood as a social construct in an
historical perspective, as his account from the ancient, holistic reason to the post-metaphysical,
particular reason has shown. Brieskorn disagrees with such a notion of reason determined by
social and historical conditions. Understanding reason from a historical perspective reduces it to
the consensus of all citizens; such a consensus – as important as it may be – overburdens reason.
Reason, as Brieskorn suggests,  following Spinoza’s  Tractatus Theologico-Politicus  (1670),  is
beyond  the  social  and  historical  dimension;  in  stark  contrast  to  religion  which  has  to  be
understood as a social and historical phenomenon.
But how can religion be properly understood? Michael Reder in his article questions two
aspects  of  Habermas’  account.  His  first  concern  is  the  danger  of  an  instrumentalization  of
religion. Religion should not be reduced to a mere provider of moral resources; religion’s social
importance  consists  in  a  variety  of  different  features  such  as  providing  ethical  world-views,
shaping cultural life and reflecting on the relation between transcendence and immanence (Reder
55). Second, Reder doubts the possibility of a strict separation between reason and religion, and
maintains the existence of a “plurality of religious-cultural hybrid forms” (Reder 55). Seen from a
global perspective, religion cannot be strictly separated from its cultural strata. Habermas’ dwells
upon Kantian philosophy and its  crucial  connection  between religion and morality;  however,
globally,  the Kantian heritage which shaped modern thinking and modern political institutions
based on the core notion of autonomy, is far from being a shared heritage. Although Habermas’
notion of reason is embedded in a social and historical situation, his account does not take into
consideration different socio-historical circumstances. Reason in the 21st century might not be
easily reducible to a monolithic, post-metaphysical rationality. 
Put in a more general way: Habermas’ argument depends on a Western strict separation
between the different  spheres  of life,  which is  a result  of philosophical  as well  as economic
7
developments in the last two centuries. These distinctions between public and private, between
religion and society, between faith and reason, are products of Western history and result in a
form of life shared only by a minority. But from a global perspective, the prevalence of religious-
cultural  forms  of  life,  the  lack  of  separations  between  the  different  domains  of  life,  put
Habermas’ argument in a different light. Although understanding reason through the historical
lenses, and although differentiating between different forms of rationalities, Habermas sticks to
the Kantian heritage and cannot accommodate culturally different impregnated rationalities. 
The Status of Religious Moral Resources
Surprisingly at first glance is the willingness of the agnostic Habermas to turn to age-old
religion  to  deal  with  a  fairly  recent  problem of  desolidarization  of  modern  society.  Why is
Habermas searching for these moral resources in religious communities? In his article, Brieskorn
is doubtful about the ability of religion to provide these resources. Religious communities are not
protected islands in a sea of modern egoism, but rather the modern tendencies of desolidarization
and egoism are penetrating, as Habermas would agree, all forms of life. The agnostic Habermas
appears  to  have  a  greater  confidence  in  the  motivating  power  of  religion  than  the  Jesuit
Brieskorn. 
Taking a step back,  one might  question  Habermas  starting  point  more  fundamentally.
Bearing in mind that Habermas understands himself as a Marxist philosopher, one wonders at the
lack  to  search  for  sources  of  solidarity  in  shared  living  conditions  or  shared  experiences  of
exploitation. Socialism (how problematic its implementation was) attempted to foster communal
action  and solidary  behavior  on  that  basis.  These  institutionalized  forms  of  solidarity  in  the
formers Socialist countries achieved the social coherence Habermas is looking for. The transition
period of the former Socialist countries to Capitalist democracies was painful for large segments
of society precisely because of the loss of these forms of institutionalized solidarity. Certainly,
revitalizing a failed political system is for no one’s benefit, but these mechanisms could serve as
a starting point for reflections about the requirements of a solidary society. After all historically,
the workers movement was able to create strong ties of solidarity due to its common condition of
life in the area of rapid industrialization.
Of course, these moral resources of the workers movement are in decline. However, there
have been contemporary attempts to revitalize this notion of solidarity by elaborating on the old
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notion of the working class, but modifying it for the 21st century.  Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri’s concept of the multitude, for example, attempts to forge shared solidarity in the midst of
globalized  capitalist  environment.  Sources  of  solidarity  might  not  be  merely  waiting  to  be
discovered, but will need to be actively created. From that perspective, Habermas’ religious turn
and his attempt to recover moral resources in the field of established religion looks dated.
Conclusion
At the beginning of his text, Habermas lays down the preconditions for both sides for a
dialogue between religion and reason. Not any religion is deemed fit for such a dialogue. As
Habermas puts it:
“The religious side has to recognize [anerkennen] the authority of ‘natural’ reason in form
of the fallible  results  of the  institutionalized  sciences  and the principles  of a  universal
egalitarianism in law [Recht] and morality. Inversely, secularized reason must not appoint
itself as a judge about truths of faith.”21
This quote highlights different aspects of the debate between Habermas and the Jesuits. It shows
on the one hand, Habermas’ understanding of religion and his interest to engage in a dialogue
with religion. Reason’s two demands – acceptance of the authority of science and recognition of
a  universal  egalitarianism  –  exclude  a  number  of  religious  communities.  Thus,  Habermas
thoughts have their place genuinely in a modern Western context. 
At  the same time,  this  quote  illustrates  the openness  and willingness  of Habermas to
engage in a discourse with proponents of organized religion and his hope to find there moral
resources to deal with the desolidarization of modern societies. In the reflection on the limits of
post-metaphysical reason, religion might be able to enlighten reason about its very own nature.
The task of an adequate understanding of the relation between society and religion, and between
faith  and  reason,  certainly  requires  further  reflections,  however,  the  discussion  between
Habermas and the Jesuits has shown the importance to conduct this discussion and provides links
to future fields of inquiry.
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1ENDNOTES
 This introduction is loosely based on the opening chapter of the discussed book entitled “Habermas
und die Religion” [Habermas and Religion]  by Michael  Reder  and Josef  Schmidt.  Next  to  the
introduction is Habermas article entitled „A Consciousness of What is Lacking“ followed by the
article of four professors of the Jesuit university in Munich, who reflect and develop on Habermas’
text. The book closes with an answer of Habermas giving the anthology the character of an ongoing
discussion.  (Michael  Reder and Josef Schmidt (ed.):  Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt.  Eine
Diskussion mit Jürgen Habermas [A Consciousness of What is Lacking. A Discussion with Jürgen
Habermas],  Frankfurt:  Suhrkamp,  2008).  A  translation  into  English  of  this  anthology  is  in
preparation. 
2 “In der  Perspektive  der  Theorie  des  kommunikativen Handelns erscheint  Religion  letztlich  al
seiner  historischen  Entwicklungsphase  auf  dem  Weg  zur  modernen,  demokratisch  verfaßten
Gesellschaft zugehörig.” (Reder/Schmidt: 13)
3 An overview on Habermas’ philosophy of religion is provided in Sebastian Maly’s article “Die
Rolle  der  Religion  in  der  postsäkularen  Gesellschaft.  Zur  Religionsphilosophie  von  Jürgen
Habermas” [The Role of Religion in Post-Secular Society. On Jürgen Habermas’ Philosophy of
Religion]
4 It is on the issue of a just balance in society that Habermas gains a skeptical view on the advent of 
biotechnological diagnosis and intervention. Habermas worries about two fundamental aspects of 
our human nature, which might be brought into an imbalance by a liberal eugenics (ie. 
biotechnological intervention based on individual choices about their offspring): first, the equality 
within society which would be threatened by the advent of a new type of relationship between 
“designer” and “product” (“designer baby”) in the case of genetic engineering, and second, the 
autonomy of the “product” would be threatened.
5 The following paragraph is a summary of the first couple of pages (27-30) of Habermas’ essay
“Ein Bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt” (A consciousness of what is lacking). 
6 „[K]omplementäre Gestalten des Geistes“ (Habermas 2008: 29)
7 Habermas’  point  in  his  German  text  might  even be stronger  as  he speaks  of  the “despair  of
practical  reason“:  “Anders  verhält  es  sich  mit  einer  praktischen  Vernunft,  die  ohne
geschichtsphilosophischen Rückhalt  an der motivierenden Kraft  ihrer  guten Gründe verzweifelt,
weil  die  Tendenzen einer  entgleisenden  Modernisierung den Geboten  ihrer  Gerechtigkeitsmoral
weniger entgegenkommen als entgegenarbeiten“. (Habermas 2008: 30)
8 Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics, Translated by E.B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973. 
See especially the last chapter entitled “Metaphysical Meditations”.
9 “Indem ich von komplementären Gestalten des Geistes spreche, wende ich mich gegen zwei 
Positionen – einerseits gegen die bornierte, über sich selbst unaufgeklärte Aufklärung, die der 
Religion jeden vernünftigen Gehalt abstreitet, aber auch gegen Hegel, für den die Religion sehr 
wohl eine erinnerungswürdige Gestalt des Geistes darstellt, aber nur in der Art eines der 
Philosophie untergeordneten vorstellenden Denkens’.” (Habermas 2008: 29)
10 Ricken p. 69f. Ricken proceeds in his essay by demonstrating Habermas translation of the Gen
1:27 into an argument of secular reason. Gen 1:27 runs as follows: “God created man in his image;
in the divine image he created him.” Men is an image and creation of God. Philosophical thought
dwells on this notion by understanding men as free (as image of God) and equal, being all equally
creations  of  God.  This  notion  of  freedom  and  equality  implies  on  the  ethical  plane  that  a
determination of another human being in its nature [Sosein] would cross the boundary between
creator and creature. Upon this argument, Habermas puts his critical stance towards biotechnology.
(Ricken 70)
11 Brieskorn over-interprets Habermas’ point. Habermas is more careful in formulating the role of
religion in public  discourse:  “Wenn aber  religiös  begründete Stellungnahmen in der politischen
Öffentlichkeit einen legitimen Platz haben, wird von seiten der politischen Gemeinschaft offiziell
anerkannt, daß religiöse Äußerungen zur Klärung kontroverser Grundsatzfragen einen sinnvollen
Beitrag leisten können.” (Habermas 2008: 34)
12 The following paragraph is a recapitulation of Habermas’ concise argument, which can be found
on p. 95-98 of his “Replik”.
13 “Um so  verständlicher  der  Rückzug  ins  Private  und  die  Verdrängung  peinlicher  kognitiver
Dissonanzen. ” (Habermas 2008: 96)
14 Barack Obama, in his first book  Dreams from My Father, describes his time as a community
organizer in Chicago and makes it very clear that the religious resources of solidarity are absolutely
necessary for bringing together a community.  Although sceptical of religion at the onset of his
work, he quickly learns that any community organizing effort will need to dwell upon the resources
of the different churches. 
15 “Die Vernunftmoral schärft unser Urteilsvermögen für die Verletzung individueller Ansprüche
und  individueller  Pflichten  und  motiviert  mit  der  schwachen  Kraft  guter  Gründe  auch  zum
moralischen Handeln. ” (Habermas 2008: 97)
16 “Die säkulare Moral ist nicht von Haus aus in gemeinsame Praktiken eingebettet. ” (Habermas 
2008: 97)
17 Habermas does not claim that more solidarity results from religious consciousness. Moreover, he 
even doubts that this resource is still available: “If this is still the case today, that may be as it is.” 
(“Ob das heute noch der Fall ist, lasse ich dahingestellt.” (Habermas 2008: 98) 
18 This task of rethinking the relation between religion and philosophy should happen in view of the 
Axial age, which brought about a shift from the myth to the logos. (“Ich halte es deshalb für 
sinnvoll, das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Religion mit einem Blick auf die Achsenzeit erneut zu
prüfen.” Habermas 2008: 98)
19 In his essay, Habermas expresses this in strong language: “Gleichzeitig verfehlt die praktische 
Vernunft ihre eigene Bestimmung, wenn sie nicht mehr die Kraft hat, in profanen Gemütern ein 
Bewußtsein für die weltweit verletzte Solidarität, ein Bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt, von dem, was
zum Himmel schreit, zu wecken und wachzuhalten.” (Habermas 2008: 30f.)
20 “Die säkulare Vernunft muß sich fragen lassen, wo sie die eigenen Vernunftsgrenzen voreilig 
gezogen hat, so daß diese ihrer wirklichen Weite nicht entsprechen.” (Schmidt: 88)
21 “Die religiöse Seite muß die Autorität der ‘natürlichen’ Vernunft als die fehlbaren Ergebnisse der
institutionalisierten Wissenschaften und die Grundsätze eines universalistischen Egalitarismus in
Recht und Moral anerkennen. Umgekehrt darf sich die säkulare Vernunft nicht zum Richter über
Glaubenswahrheiten aufwerfen.” (Habermas 2008: 27)
